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CORPORATE RIGHTS AND MORAL THEORY: 
THE NEED FOR A COHERENT THEORETICAL 
JUSTIFICATION OF CORPORATE RIGHTS 
RYNE T. DUFFY* 
ABSTRACT 
Corporations are the primary engine of economic activity in the United 
States and they are provided with legal rights primarily to facilitate their 
productive activity. As economic actors, corporations must inevitably 
interact with other corporations and natural persons within the legal 
system. Corporations must be allowed to invoke legal rights in order to 
operate within the American legal system. Traditionally, the American legal 
system has classified corporations as legal “persons” to allow them to 
seamlessly integrate into the existing legal system. This Note tackles the 
question of corporate personhood utilizing an approach inspired by social 
contract theory and seeks to answer the fundamental question of what kind 
of person a corporation ought to be considered. From this initial 
conclusion, this Note will address the legal implications of the chosen rights 
justifying theory and explore alternate options.   
INTRODUCTION 
The creation and maintenance of American law has always involved 
careful decisions about how to balance the competing interests of 
individuals, private organizations, and government bodies. We balance 
individual rights with restrictions on individuals, in the form of legal 
obligations, to enhance broader social cohesion. We assign rights to 
persons, not because they are earned, but because they are deserved. Social 
contract theory has grown alongside the American legal tradition and has 
had a strong influence on how Americans conceive of personhood, rights, 
and the role of the state in social ordering. Social contract theory posits that 
individuals consent to a government and willingly exchange a portion of 
their natural rights in exchange for the greater predictability and security of 
a centralized State. Social contract theory endeavors to describe the 
motivations for entering into this sort of an agreement and seeks to  
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understand its terms—namely what rights have been preserved for natural 
persons and what rights have been allocated to the government.  
While natural persons are the central actors in our society, even a 
cursory examination of the news will reveal that they are not the only actors. 
We live in a world of formal and informal organizations. These 
organizations consist of groups of natural persons who coalesce around 
goals which might be unattainable for a single individual. The clearest 
distinction between formal and informal organizations is how the law 
interprets their actions. Formal organizations—such as governments, non-
profits, clubs, political parties, and corporations—are regarded by the law 
as the “actors.”1 These formal organizations are considered by the law to act 
on their own behalf—when a corporation purchases property, it does so in 
its own name. As such, formal organizations are assigned a variety of legal 
rights and obligations to ensure that they can operate within our existing 
rights-based legal structure. This Note will focus on a specific sub-type of 
formal organization: the business corporation. Corporations, like many 
other formal organizations, are analogized to “persons” under federal law.2 
This analogy was largely a product of history.3 Following in the English 
tradition, early American corporations could only be created by a specific 
act of the state legislature.4 Early corporations were perceived as agents 
acting in the public interest rather than as bastions of private enterprise.5 
This perception changed as corporations proliferated during the industrial 
revolution.6 The American public, as well as legislators on the state and 
federal level, began to view corporations as fundamentally private entities.7 
As these newly conceived private corporations grew in size, legal scholars 
worried about how the law should classify corporations to protect natural 
persons from harm while preserving the ability of the corporation to conduct 
its business.8 Legal theorists of the industrial era struggled to adapt the 
existing legal system to a new kind of private power—the modern business 
 
 
1. John Ladd, Morality and the Ideal of Rationality in Formal Organizations, 54 THE MONIST 
488, 513 (1970).  
2. See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (“[T]he words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations, companies, 
associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”).  
3. See generally Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in 
American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441 (1987). 
4. ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR 
CIVIL RIGHTS 48-50 (2018). 
5. Mark, supra note 3, at 1444-45. 
6. Id. at 1445. 
7. Id. 
8 Id. (“With characteristics resembling those of individuals as well as governments, the large 
corporation did not fit well into a legal system designed to mediate conflicts between individuals and 
between individuals and government.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss2/7
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corporation.9 The American legal system dealt with the emergence of the 
private corporation by simply including corporations within the legal 
definition of personhood without critically examining the differences 
between corporations and natural persons.10 Nobody actually believed that 
corporations were natural persons. Instead, courts and legislators extended 
the legal concept of personhood in order to assign rights—and their 
corresponding legal obligations—to corporations, enabling them to 
effectively interact with other organizations and natural persons within the 
existing legal system. This Note evaluates the three primary theoretical 
justifications for providing individual rights to corporations and compares 
these theories to the justifications for providing rights to natural persons.  
The provision of individual rights, as a matter of political theory, is an 
intentional allocation of legal power. The law expects that natural persons 
are capable, conscious individuals and presumes that they will exercise their 
natural faculties when using their rights.11 This Note begins with the 
premise that the U.S. Constitution, when drafted, was designed only to 
provide individual rights to natural persons and that these rights were 
specifically allocated to individuals as a means of restricting the power of 
the government. This premise implies that the particular individual rights 
assigned under the U.S. Constitution were not intended to be used by 
corporations.  
Corporations are fundamentally different than natural persons. They 
differ in their decision-making, actions, and priorities. Business 
corporations, generally speaking, exist to make money for their owners. The 
actions of a corporation are controlled by a group of individuals known as 
a board of directors who are elected by shareholders.12 Directors are 
supposed to pursue the interests of shareholders and to promote the 
wellbeing and financial success of a corporation.  
Because corporations are motivated by a completely different set of 
incentives than individuals, we cannot expect them to act the same way that 
individuals would in any given situation. This idea—that corporations and 
individuals will exercise their legal rights differently due to divergent 
incentives—suggests that the individual rights allocated to natural persons 
under the U.S. Constitution may not be particularly appropriate for 
corporations. If we rely on a social contract-based understanding of the 
Constitution, this difference in motivations can be understood as disturbing 
 
 
9. Id. 
10. See 1 U.S.C. § 1. 
11. See infra Section I (C). 
12. James Chen, Board of Directors (B of D), INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 21, 2019, 1:05PM), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/boardofdirectors.asp [https://perma.cc/LG5P-GTAW] 
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the Constitutional balance of individual rights and government power.  If 
we cannot expect corporations to use their rights to uphold the balance of 
public and private power struck by the Constitution, then we should 
critically evaluate what rights we choose to give corporations. This Note 
will not argue for the abolishment of corporate rights. Instead, the core 
argument of this Note is that corporations should only be provided with 
rights which they are capable of exercising in the same ways that natural 
persons would. 
Section I will explore the concept of legal rights and the dominant 
theoretical justifications for providing rights to natural persons in three sub-
parts. Subsection A introduces a descriptive framework to understand the 
nature of legal rights. Subsection B presents two dominant strains of social 
contract theory, and Subsection C examines these theories and selected 
examples from modern common law doctrines to determine if there is an 
implied relationship between the provision of individual rights and the 
consciousness of the rights-holder. Section I ultimately seeks to introduce a 
basic social contractarian understanding of legal rights and to identify 
situations where the law treats consciousness as a necessary pre-condition 
for the exercise of these legal rights.  
Section II presents the structure of a modern corporation and suggests 
important distinctions between individual and corporate behavior. Next, 
Section III will present the three dominant philosophical justifications for 
the provision of corporate rights and explore the doctrinal implications of 
each theory. Finally, Section IV will compare the theoretical justifications 
for providing corporate rights with the theoretical justifications for 
providing individuals with rights.  
I. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORIES, AND TRENDS IN 
AMERICAN LAW 
A. Individual Rights Defined 
This Note will rely on the analytical framework developed by Professor 
Wesley Hohfeld to inform the forthcoming discussion on individual rights 
and their corporate counterparts. Hohfeld offered a functional definition of 
rights that is logically consistent, analytically clear, and practically useful.13 
Hohfeld’s theory rests on his understanding that rights can only logically 
 
 
13. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss2/7
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refer to the legal relationships among persons to the exclusion of rights 
against things.14  
Hohfeld identified eight core categories that describe the legal relations 
among persons which we colloquially understand to be rights: rights, 
privileges, powers, immunities, no-rights, duties, disabilities, and 
liabilities.15 Hohfeld defines a right as a legally enforceable claim.16 This 
definition limits the scope of pure rights to situations where an individual 
may legitimately invoke the power of the law to compel or enjoin the 
conduct of another. The Hohfeldian notion of rights corresponds to his 
understanding of legal duties.17 Under this framework, whenever a right 
exists there is also a correlating duty.18 If one person compels another by 
invoking the law, the party being compelled has a legal obligation—a 
Hohfeldian duty—to comply.19 
In contrast, a person with a legal privilege is entitled to engage or 
abstain from a specified course of conduct. The Hohfeldian correlative of a 
legal privilege is called a “no-right.” 20 When no-right exists, the person with 
no-right lacks legal authority to compel a course of conduct by the 
privileged party. 
“Power” in the Hohfeldian scheme is the ability to rightfully and 
unilaterally alter a legal relationship.21 Under the law of contracts, a party 
who is presented with an offer has the power to accept the offer and thereby 
unilaterally change the legal relationship between herself and the offeror. 22 
Acceptance of the offer saddles each party with contractual duties and 
fundamentally limits the autonomy of each actor vis-à-vis each other. Power 
correlates with legal disability. Legal are legal relationships that cannot be 
altered by the parties subject to them. For example, under the law of agency, 
a disclaimer that no agency is created by a certain course of conduct will 
not serve to disprove an agency relationship if the requisite elements are 
met.23 
 
 
14. Id. at 721-22.  
15. Hohfeld, supra note 13, at 710. 
16. Id. at 718. 
17. Id. at 710. 
18. Id. 
19. Hohfeld, supra note 13, at 710. 
20. Id.  
21. Id. at 746. 
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1979). 
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 cmt. b (1958)  
Agency is a legal concept which depends upon the existence of required factual elements [....] 
The relation which the law calls agency does not depend upon the intent of the parties to create 
it, nor their belief that they have done so. To constitute the relation, there must be an agreement, 
but not necessarily a contract, between the parties; if the agreement results in the factual relation 
between them to which are attached the legal consequences of agency, an agency exists 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The final family of rights identified by Hohfeld are immunities.24 An 
immunity protects the holder from certain types of conduct by others.25 
Individuals with immunities have “negative rights.” They may demand to 
not be treated in certain ways or to not be subjected to certain actions, and 
they have a Hohfeldian right to invoke government power to prevent or 
remedy a violation of an immunity. Intuitively, Hohfeldian immunities 
correlate with liabilities. Whenever an immunity is violated, the party who 
has violated the immunity is liable to its holder. 
For simplicity’s sake, immunities, rights, and privileges will all be 
referred to as “rights” or individual rights in this Note. The final Hohfeldian 
category of a right—the concept of a legal power—will be omitted from this 
discussion because the notion of Hohfeldian power is best suited to 
analyzing legal relations between private parties and is generally less 
applicable to the relationship between private parties and the government.26 
Throughout this work, the correlative notions of each sub-type of right will 
collectively be referred to as “legal obligations.”  
B. Social Contract Theories 
American legal and political discourse has historically relied on several 
enlightenment-era rights theories. This Note will explore the contributions 
of two of the most influential thinkers of the enlightenment: John Locke and 
Jean Jacques Rousseau.  
Both Locke and Rousseau are known as “social contract theorists.”27 
Social contract theory posits that the function of a legitimate government is 
to protect pre-determined individual rights by creating legal obligations to 
refrain from certain behaviors.28 Social contract theory treats governments 
as artificial creations of human societies whose only function is to perform 
according to the voluntary agreement to which they owe their creation. 
Governments define and protect individual rights, and citizens collectively 
agree to refrain from behavior that would invade upon other people’s rights 
 
 
although the parties did not call it agency and did not intend the legal consequences of the 
relation to follow. 
24. Hohfeld, supra note 13, at 710. 
25. Id. at 746-47. 
26. Hohfeld, supra note 13, at 746-66 (discussing legal power in terms of property disputes 
among individuals). 
27. Fred D’Agostino, et al., Contemporary Approaches to the Social Contract, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., (Edward N. Zalta ed. 2017) 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/contractarianism-contemporary 
[https://perma.cc/83PX-S6S7] 
28. Id. at § 1.1. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss2/7
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or otherwise contribute to social destabilization.29 Traditional social 
contract theorists generally understood the notion of personhood to refer 
only to natural persons. Locke and Rousseau agreed with the notion that 
natural persons created “civil society” by relinquishing the privilege to do 
certain things, which could be harmful to the rights of others, in exchange 
for assurances that the state would protect socially sanctioned behavior. 
However, each theorist had his own distinct conception about what 
motivated this exchange and his own interpretation of the value of such a 
social arrangement. Their writings on social contract theory still inform our 
conceptions of why rights are provided and serve to justify the imposition 
of legal duties for both individuals and corporations.  
 John Locke’s works were widely read in the American Colonies during 
the pre-revolutionary period and are still taught as a core pillar of American 
rights theory.30 Locke’s Second Treatise on Government has been 
particularly influential in American philosophy, both at the time of the 
founding and today.31 Locke’s rights theory begins with an 
acknowledgement that in a “state of nature” humans each possess an equal 
right to life, liberty, and property.32 These rights are “natural rights” as they 
exist in the absence of any form of government. In Locke’s state of nature, 
these basic rights are accompanied by obligations to refrain from invading 
upon the natural rights of another person.33 In the Lockean state of nature, 
the enforcement of these duties is left to each individual.34 This state of 
nature gives way to a legitimate civil society when each individual “forgoes 
his executive power of the law of nature, giving it over to the public.”35 
Locke’s executive power refers to the legal right of an individual in the state 
of nature to enforce their natural rights directly against another. This ability 
to enforce a right privately—without any intermediary—is itself a key 
natural right. However, Locke suggests that humans are willing to forego 
the right to enforce natural law privately in order to gain the practical ability 
to exercise their remaining rights.36 
Locke’s theory relies on three assumptions. First, that humans in the 
state of nature are conscious of their obligations to enforce the natural law 
 
 
29. Id. 
30. See generally Donald L. Doernberg, "We the People": John Locke, Collective 
Constitutional Rights, and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 52 (1985). 
31. Id. 
32. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT 38-40, (Johnathan Bennett ed. 2008). 
33. Id. at 4. 
34. Id. at 29. 
35. Id.  
36. LOCKE, supra note 32, at 40.  
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but aware that decentralized justice systems lack predictability.37 Locke 
notes that humans are self-aware, that we are primarily self-interested, and 
that we expect others to be similarly biased.38 Locke finally suggests that 
individuals are willing to relinquish a portion of their rights in a state of 
nature to protect their physical beings. Locke posits that without a 
government “[p]eople who have committed crimes will usually, if they can, 
resort to force to retain the benefits of their crime.”39 He recognizes that 
“such resistance often makes the punishment dangerous, even destructive, 
to those who try to inflict it.”40  
Locke’s theory is firmly couched in his understanding of individual 
behavior, but a great deal of his reasoning applies with equal force to 
corporate actors. Corporations rely almost entirely on the enforcement of 
contractual obligations for their survival. The very existence of a 
corporation can be analogized to a contract with the state, although separate 
from the broader social contract discussed by Locke.41 Corporations rely on 
the stability afforded by a predictable body of law administered by an 
impartial government to the same extent—if not more so—than individuals.   
 To summarize, John Locke’s vein of social contract theory emphasizes 
that humans voluntarily form political societies as a conscious mechanism 
to ensure that each individual’s security—namely their body and physical 
property—are protected by a predictable and impartial system of law. His 
theory emphasizes the importance of individual and group consciousness in 
the formation of rights-based political societies. 
 Jean Jacques Rousseau’s theory suggests that human consciousness 
was a primary motivation for the organization of early political units.42 His 
premise is that humans, in their natural state, had the ability to be self-
 
 
37. Id. 
The state of nature lacks an established, settled, known law, received and accepted by common 
consent as the standard of right and wrong and as the common measure to decide all 
controversies. What about the law of nature? Well, it is plain and intelligible to all reasonable 
creatures; but men are biased by self-interest, as well as ignorant about the law of nature 
because they don’t study it; and so they aren’t apt to accept it as a law that will bind them if it 
is applied to their particular cases. 
 38. Id. (“[T]he law of nature…is plain and intelligible to all reasonable creatures; but men are 
biased by self-interest…they aren’t apt to accept [the law of nature] as a law that will bind them if it is 
applied to their particular cases.” (alterations added)). 
39. Id. (emphasis removed). 
40. Id. 
41. For a thorough discussion of the contractual theory of corporate organization see Steven 
N. S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1983). See also R.H. Coase, The 
Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
42. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, A DISCOURSE ON A SUBJECT PROPOSED BY THE ACADEMY OF 
DIJON: WHAT IS THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY AMONG MEN, AND IS IT AUTHORISED BY NATURAL LAW?, 
13-14 (G.D.H. Cole trans., n.p. 1754) [hereinafter ORIGINS]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss2/7
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sufficient animals.43 However, as consciousness developed, humans could 
conceive of, and therefore desire, specific physical objects.44 As humans 
became more aware of their abilities to alter the natural world, they came to 
desire products which they could not produce themselves.45 In order to 
obtain the fruits of specialization, humans were forced to depend on each 
other and to formalize a system of exchange to fulfill their conscious 
wants.46 This newfound interdependency was accompanied by a desire for 
protection. Individuals, particularly those with the most material goods to 
lose, craved stability in their dealings with each other and pursued a system 
of centralized government to protect individuals from violence.47 
Rousseau’s theory is especially applicable to corporations, which tend to 
concentrate wealth under the control of relatively few individuals who 
might not otherwise be able to protect their property.  
Despite the differences in their reasoning, Rousseau and Locke provide 
similar analyses of the root causes of rights-oriented political organizations. 
Rousseau’s theory emphasizes human consciousness as a primary 
motivating factor for the development of governments. His explanation for 
the development of societies centers on the need for property rights, which 
arose after humans began to conceive of material wants and engaged in the 
production of material goods. Rousseau placed great weight on the notion 
that humans create governments to incentivize manufacturing and to protect 
individuals’ rights to property. Locke’s writings focused on the conscious 
motivations of individuals in forming voluntary governments. Locke 
stressed that a state apparatus was necessary to protect individuals from the 
inconsistencies of privately enforced laws while preserving some degree of 
individual rights.  
 
 
43. Id. at 14. 
44. Id.  
It is by the activity of our passions, that our reason improves: we covet knowledge merely 
because we covet enjoyment, and it is impossible to conceive why a man exempt from fears 
and desires should take the trouble to reason. The passions, in their turn, owe their origin to our 
wants, and their increase to our progress in science; for we cannot desire or fear anything, but 
in consequence of the ideas we have of it. 
Id. at 15. 
 45. See id.  
 46. Id. at 29.  
On the other hand, free and independent as men were before, they were now, in consequence 
of a multiplicity of new wants, brought into subjection, as it were, to all nature, and particularly 
to one another; and each became in some degree a slave even in becoming the master of other 
men: if rich, they stood in need of the services of others; if poor, of their assistance; and even 
a middle condition did not enable them to do without one another. 
 47.  Id. at 26-27. 
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The writings of Locke and Rousseau are certainly timeless, but both 
authors died before the establishment of the United States. In order to build 
a better understanding of the justifications for individual rights in the 
American system, we must now turn to examples from contemporary voices 
and the law itself to elucidate exactly why we give individuals rights and 
what we expect those individuals to do with them.  
  
C. Philosophical Personhood: Examples in the Law 
Our system of law harbors an implicit expectation that individuals will 
understand their physical surroundings,48 will be aware of themselves, will 
control their physical actions,49 will predict the likely effects of their actions 
on inanimate objects and other people,50 and will internalize and act 
according to a code of social norms collectively known as morality. We 
exercise consciousness constantly and expect others to do so as well.  
Both the criminal law and the law of negligence rely on notions of 
individual consciousness.51 These common law doctrines form the context 
within which rights are exercised and are essential to understanding why 
individuals are provided with rights and the expectations for how those 
rights will be used. Individuals use their rights as a means to pursue and 
secure personal satisfaction. As a society we feel comfortable affording 
these rights to individuals because we expect them to employ their rights 
within the bounds of morality. We can rely on individuals, for the most part, 
to utilize their rights responsibly because we assume that each individual 
will possess—and exercise—the ability to consider the possibility of harm 
posed by their actions and seek to avoid harm to others.52 This theory 
assumes that individuals possess both autonomy and empathy and that they 
can employ these dual facilities to act as moral agents when faced with 
 
 
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 290 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
49. Id. at § 2 cmt. a. 
50. Id. at § 282 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
51. See id. at § 2, 282, 290 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) and accompanying text; See also 21 AM. 
JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 33 (2019) and accompanying text. 
52. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 33 (2019) (footnotes omitted) (alterations added) 
A basic postulate of criminal law is a free agent confronted with a choice between doing right 
and doing wrong and choosing freely to do wrong. A verdict of guilty is dependent upon the 
concept of responsibility, and focuses on the punishment of an individual for his vicious will—
his free choice to do wrong. To prove that a defendant had the mental capacity to commit the 
crime, the State must show that he or she knew right from wrong under the test for determining 
whether a person was sane at the time he or she committed the crime. Capacity to commit a 
crime is therefore an essential requisite to criminal responsibility. A person lacking the mental 
capacity to commit a crime cannot be held criminally responsible for his or her actions.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss2/7
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decisions. The moral agency of individuals—their ability to consider the 
consequences of their actions and to understand how their community is 
likely to react to those actions—is an essential justification for the 
assignment of individual rights to natural persons. 
The law generally presumes that individuals operate on a fairly level 
playing field in terms of their cognitive abilities. Individuals are generally 
allowed to act as they please, subject to a legal obligation to avoid causing 
harm to others.53 The common law expects that individuals will take 
appropriate precautions before acting in order to avoid subjecting others to 
unreasonable risks of harm.54 Under the common law doctrine of 
negligence, an individual’s actions are compared with those of a 
hypothetical “reasonable person,” under the same circumstances, to 
determine if the individual has violated a legal obligation owed to an injured 
party. The Second Restatement of Torts suggests that an  
actor is required to recognize that his conduct involves a risk of 
causing an invasion of another's interest if a reasonable man would 
do so while exercising…such attention, perception of the 
circumstances, memory, knowledge of other pertinent matters, 
intelligence, and judgment as a reasonable man would . . . .55  
While the Second Restatement of Torts is not law, it is a reliable catalogue 
of the principles to which common law judges generally adhere.56 The 
standard imposed by section 289 suggests an implicit expectation that  
individuals are capable of perceiving their immediate circumstances, 
understanding the rights of other people around them, and predicting that 
their actions may affect others.57 Most importantly, the restatement and 
generally the law of negligence assume that individuals can consciously 
alter their course of conduct by controlling their physical behavior.58 The 
common law’s reasonable person standard is an important indication of the 
degree of consciousness which our legal system presumes individuals 
 
 
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 48, at § 282. 
54. “Negligence is a departure from a standard of conduct demanded by the community for 
the protection of others against unreasonable risk.” Id., at § 283 cmt. c. 
55. Id. at § 289. 
56. Catherine Biondo, Secondary Sources: ALRs, Encyclopedias, Law Reviews, Restatements, 
& Treatises, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL LIBRARY (Feb. 4, 2019), 
https://guides.library.harvard.edu/c.php?g=309942&p=2070280 [https://perma.cc/5SEJ-YMGD] 
(“Restatements are not primary law. Due to the prestige of the ALI and its painstaking drafting process, 
however, they are considered persuasive authority by many courts. The most heavily cited Restatements 
are the Restatement of Torts and the Restatement of Contracts.”). 
57. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 41, at § 282. 
58. Id. at § 291 cmt. d (explaining the method by which the law expects an individual to weigh 
the probable outcomes of their actions). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
278 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 12:2 
 
 
 
possess. The law of negligence provides an excellent outline of the mental 
faculties that each individual is presumed to have. In contrast, the criminal 
law operationalizes our understanding of the reasonable person by 
providing concrete examples of behavior that the law classifies as 
categorically prohibited.   
Criminal law is the largest body of legal obligations in the American 
system. In theory, the criminal law functions as a moral barometer, 
translating general moral principles into specific prohibitions. The most 
basic definition of a crime is a prohibited act performed with a culpable 
mental state.59 The requirement of a culpable mental state in criminal law is 
fundamentally concerned with the moral decision making of the actor.60 The 
criminal law creates a legal obligation to exercise moral judgements and 
punishes those who fail to consider the moral implications of their actions.  
When individuals do not possess the conscious faculties to fully 
understand the world around them, they can legitimately be stripped of some 
of their legal rights. For example, every state has some system of 
guardianship.61 Guardianship is a legal arrangement where a court may, on 
petition from an interested party, appoint a guardian to oversee the personal 
life of an incapacitated person, known as a ward.62 Wards are generally older 
people who, by reason of their age or a serious medical condition, cannot 
protect themselves against abuse, neglect, and predation.63 When a guardian 
is appointed, their ward “loses basic rights, such as the right to vote, sign 
contracts, buy or sell real estate, marry or divorce, or make decisions about 
medical procedures.”64 The fundamental premise of guardianship is that 
when a ward lacks the ability to exercise their consciousness fully, they 
should not be entrusted with the same legal rights. The practice of 
guardianship demonstrates that the law expects legal rights to be exercised 
consciously and that those lacking consciousness cannot avail themselves 
of legal rights. When individuals are unable to understand the moral 
implications of their actions, they are relieved of some of their legal 
obligations. The diminished capacity and insanity defenses in criminal law 
 
 
59. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 4 (2019). 
60. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015) (quoting Morissette v. United States, 
342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952)) (“[T]he basic principle [is] that ‘wrongdoing must be conscious to be 
criminal.’”). 
61. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, (NCD), BEYOND GUARDIANSHIP: TOWARD 
ALTERNATIVES THAT PROMOTE GREATER SELF-DETERMINATION 31 (2018) 
https://ncd.gov/publications/2018/beyond-guardianship-toward-alternatives [https://perma.cc/DFM5-
VVSB]. 
62. Id. at 30. 
63. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-655, GUARDIANSHIPS: COLLABORATION 
NEEDED TO PROTECT INCAPACITATED ELDERLY PEOPLE 5 (2004). 
64. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss2/7
 
 
 
 
 
 
2020] CORPORATE RIGHTS & MORAL THEORY 279 
 
 
 
provide clear examples. The diminished capacity defense allows criminal 
defendants to offer evidence showing that they were incapable of having a 
culpable mental state during the commission of an act by virtue of mental 
handicaps, trauma, or intoxication.65 The diminished capacity defense 
essentially claims that a person was incapable of either predicting the likely 
result of their actions or incapable of fully grasping the moral significance 
of those acts.66 The diminished capacity defense is a partial defense, and 
generally will only serve to reduce the severity of the offense charged, or in 
the federal system, to reduce the defendant’s recommended sentence.67 
Insanity takes this line of reasoning even further and provides a complete 
defense, meaning the absolution of all criminal liability for the accused, if 
that person “suffered from a mental disease or defect which prevented him 
from distinguishing between right and wrong at the time he committed the 
conduct in question.”68 The insanity defense is squarely aimed at relieving 
individuals—who are incapable of understanding the moral implications of 
their actions—from the legal obligation to conform to the criminal law. 
While a successful insanity defense is rare, the theory underlying the 
defense remains potent: individuals who cannot exercise moral judgement 
should not be subject to the same legal obligations or possess the same legal 
rights as those who can.  
If natural persons are regularly stripped of individual rights and legal 
obligations, which the law determines that they are unable to exercise, 
corporations ought to be similarly limited. Corporations should only be 
provided with rights that we trust them to use in conformity with our social 
conception of morality. If corporations cannot be expected to act as moral 
agents, then it would be dangerous to entrust them with the wide latitude for 
autonomy that our society provides to moral agents.  
II. CORPORATIONS 
Broadly speaking, business corporations are legal entities created by 
individuals to accumulate property and engage in productive activity. The 
corporate law has long recognized that the primary purpose of the business 
corporation is to maximize the profits for shareholders using an appropriate 
degree of business judgement.69 Corporate literature refers to this concept 
 
 
65. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 36 (2019). 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 43 (2019). 
69. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919).  
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. 
The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be 
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as the shareholder wealth maximization norm, and corporate scholars argue 
this norm is particularly important in the American economic system. 70  
Modern society relies almost exclusively on corporations to produce 
necessary and desirable goods and services.71  
 The modern corporation is characterized by six key features: formal 
creation, the separation of ownership and control, limited liability for 
shareholders, freely alienable ownership interests, an indefinite duration, 
and legal personality.72 A corporation is a specific type of legal entity and 
must be created according to the incorporation procedures of the state in 
which it resides.73 The feature that historically distinguished corporations 
from other types of business organizations is limited liability for 
shareholders.74 In sole proprietorships and partnerships, the people who own 
the business are liable for the debts of the business. Limited liability refers 
to the concept that a shareholder of a corporation cannot lose any more 
money than the value of the shares they own.75 Corporations exhibit a 
separation of ownership and control.76 The corporation and all of its assets 
are theoretically owned by the shareholders. However, the conduct of a 
modern corporation is controlled almost entirely by a body known as the 
board of directors and the managers that the board hires.77  
The shares of a corporation are freely alienable, meaning that the 
shareholder generally can, at the time of their choice, sell any shares that 
they own without the consent of the corporation.78 This system of dispersed 
ownership and alienability allows corporations to exist indefinitely—
beyond the life of any natural person. Once a corporation is chartered, its 
existence continues indefinitely until the shareholders choose to liquidate 
the corporation or fail to pay the requisite fees to the state, allowing their 
charter to lapse.79 Bestowing legal personality on the corporation entrusts 
 
 
exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end 
itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order 
to devote them to other purposes.  
Cf. Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law after Hobby Lobby, 70 THE BUS. LAW. 1 (2014). 
70. O. Scott Stovall et al., Corporate Governance, Internal Decision Making, and the Invisible 
Hand, 51 J. BUS. ETHICS 221 (2004); See generally Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization 
Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063 (2001). 
71. Gomory, Raloh, Sylla, Richard, The American Corporation, 142 DAEDALUS 101, 112 
(2013).  
72. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 1 (3d ed. 2015). 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 7. 
75. Id. 
76. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 72, at 4-5. 
77. Id.  
78. Id. at 7. 
79. Id. at 6-7. 
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the organization with the ability to own property, sue in its own name, and, 
to some extent, to invoke individual rights.80 
 The six traits outlined above each contribute to corporate behavior. 
Limited liability encourages potential shareholders to “buy in” to a 
corporation by limiting their exposure in the event that the venture fails. The 
separation of ownership and control allows individuals, who may not have 
the skills to pursue a business on their own, to reap the rewards of a 
successful corporation with minimal effort. Additionally, corporations have 
a single goal, profit maximization. The separation of ownership and control 
in the corporate context facilitates this end by instituting small, efficient 
boards of directors in order to make quick and professionally considered 
decisions. Freely alienable ownership interests allow corporations to gather 
capital by selling shares—significantly lessening the amount of money that 
any particular individual would need to pursue a business. Alienable 
ownership interests allow shareholders to come and go as they please. If a 
shareholder is dissatisfied with the corporation, or simply wants their money 
back, it is relatively easy to sell any shares on a stock market. The indefinite 
duration of corporations eliminates the need to dissolve an organization 
every time its leadership changes, making corporations extremely stable and 
potentially quite profitable. Finally, and most consequentially, the legal 
personhood of corporations allows the organization to—in the eyes of the 
law—act independently from its owners. Personhood allows the corporation 
to interact with our legal system as an independent entity—exercising its 
own rights and assuming liability for its own obligations.  
These structural features of the corporation contribute heavily to the 
process of corporate decision making. The most prominent descriptive 
model of corporate behavior is neoclassical economics.81 Neoclassical 
economic theorists often rely on the work of Adam Smith, an eighteenth-
century political economist, best known for his book The Wealth of 
Nations.82  
Neoclassical economists stress that the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm is the optimal theoretical objective of corporate 
behavior because individual corporations acting solely in their own interests 
create the largest possible net benefit to society.83 This theory explicitly 
relies on the separation of ownership and control to justify a normative 
theory of corporate behavior where a corporation acts to benefit the tiny 
fraction of the population who are shareholders. Smith, unlike many modern 
 
 
80. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 72, at 3-4. 
81. Stovall, supra note 70, at 222. 
82. Id. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776). 
83. Stovall, supra note 70, at 222-23. 
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neoclassicists, recognized that an unfettered devotion to the principle of 
wealth maximization would result in the very social instability that the law 
wishes to preserve.84 Smith recognized that individual cognition and moral 
agency were essential elements of social cohesion.85 Because corporations 
are only concerned with making money, they cannot be expected to consider 
and assess the moral implications of their actions. Corporations act 
differently than natural persons because their motives are entirely controlled 
by others, whereas individuals are presumed to operate according to purely 
internal decisions.86 The law ought to accept this fundamental premise of 
organizational theory and adapt its provision of corporate rights to conform 
with the largely amoral decision making structure of a corporation. 
III. CORPORATE PERSONHOOD THEORIES 
For most of American legal history, corporations have been afforded 
rights under the law.87, 88 Corporations have a right to free speech,89 freedom 
of religion,90 freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures,91 as well as 
the right to equal protection under the law,92 and the right to due process of 
law.93  
There are three primary theories of corporate personhood: the artificial-
dependent theory, the independent personhood theory, and the aggregate 
 
 
84. “[V]irtues such as justice and beneficence hold self-interest in check in order to maintain 
and enhance social welfare. Self-interest alone, without the presence of justice, provides an untenable 
condition, one in which society cannot sustain itself.” Id. at 226-23 (citing ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY 
OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (Edinburgh, 1790), 
https://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS.html?chapter_num=1#book-reader).1759 
[https://perma.cc/D9UL-7CW5] 
85. Id. at 225 
For Smith, this original passion or latent capacity of sympathy allows one to build a sense of 
morality, what we might call a moral or ethical code. Smith maintains that this innate sense of 
being able to see others’ interests allows individuals, and ultimately societies, to develop 
concepts such as benevolence, altruism, and even justice. 
86. See Ladd, supra note 1, at 494-95. 
87. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819) (holding that private 
corporations are the holders of certain constitutional rights); cf. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 
U.S. 61, 86-87 (1809) (holding that a corporation is not a citizen under the constitution and denying the 
right of corporations to invoke diversity jurisdiction in the federal courts). 
88. KENT GREENFIELD, CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE TOO: AND THEY SHOULD ACT LIKE IT 3 
(2018). 
89. Id. at 13. 
90. Id. at 57-58. 
91. Id. at 77-79. 
92. GREENFIELD, supra note 88, at 90. 
93. Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U. PENN L. REV. 
95, 133 (2014). 
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theory of corporate rights.94 The theories offer divergent perspectives on the 
nature of the corporation and the justifications for giving corporations 
rights, but they all seek to fit corporations into the existing rights-based 
American legal system.95 
The artificial existence theory posits that corporations exist solely as 
legal entities—fictions created by the law to facilitate the integration of 
corporations into the existing rights-based structure of American law. Under 
this theory, the law does not use the term “personhood” in a descriptive 
sense. Rather, corporations are referred to as persons to provide a 
mechanism for providing the limited legal rights and obligations which 
society has determined to be necessary for corporations to be productive.96  
The independent personhood theory arose in the late nineteenth century 
as the legal realist response to an increased interest in the regulation of large 
corporations.97 At this time, the United States was experiencing a period of 
rapid economic development while continuing to grapple with how to treat 
corporate entities.98 Shareholders were , by this time, more dispersed than 
ever before, and it was becoming clear that corporations were shifting away 
from “ownership control” and towards “managerial control.”99 Independent 
personhood theorists posited that the corporation, distinct from its 
individual owners, possessed the requisite autonomy to consider its actions 
and to act as an independent moral agent.  
The aggregate, or associational, theory of the corporation posits that 
corporations are nothing more than products of both contractual agreements 
between the government and natural persons and agreements between 
individual natural persons to conduct a joint business. Corporations are 
personified as an administrative convenience in order to allow natural 
persons, who are actually acting on the corporation’s behalf, to signal to the 
outside world that their particular courses of conduct can be attributed to the 
 
 
94. Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to 
the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 106-12 (2009); Jess M. 
Krannich, The Corporate "Person": A New Analytical Approach to A Flawed Method of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 63 (2005). 
Three distinct metaphors of the corporate entity are discussed: the artificial entity theory, the 
aggregate entity theory, and the real entity theory. . . . The Court has adopted all three metaphors 
in addressing the constitutional rights of corporations, and all three metaphors (as well as their 
variants) can be seen in modern corporate constitutional jurisprudence. 
95. Krannich, supra note 94, at 62. 
96. Ripken, supra note 94, at 106. 
97. Krannich, supra note 94, at 82-83. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
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corporation.  Under the aggregate theory, a corporation is nothing more than 
the product of these contractual agreements.100 
A. Artificial-Dependent Existence Theory 
Under the artificial-dependent existence theory, we give corporations 
rights because it is a convenient way to insert the corporate form into our 
pre-existing rights system.101 Corporations, under this theory, are 
considered to be both fictional and functional entities. The corporate form 
is a legal fiction, a tool to help natural persons engage in productive activity 
with the protections of limited liability and access to capital markets. The 
artificial-dependent existence theory posits that corporations are “artificial,” 
in the sense that they are a product of human creation, and that corporations 
are “dependent” because their very existence depends on recognition from 
the state.102,103 The artificial theory also posits that corporations depend on 
legislative action for their creation.104  
The artificial-dependent theory has its roots in the historical conception 
of corporations as quasi-public entities.105 This theory was derived from the 
practices of early Roman and British companies who were chartered by the 
state.106 Corporations were approved by legislators who had to be convinced 
of a public need for the operation of that particular corporation.107 This 
method of specific, rather than general, incorporation was intended to create 
corporations designed to provide direct public benefits. Public corporations 
aggregated capital to meet public needs that could not be adequately be 
fulfilled by individual actors or small joint enterprises.108 Because 
corporations created by specific incorporation were, in effect, negotiating 
with the legislature for their existence, it makes sense that the legislature 
should be free to negotiate the “terms” of the agreement—the rights and 
legal obligations of the corporation.109 
 
 
100. Careful readers will note that the aggregate theory of corporate personhood applies the 
contractual theory of corporate organization discussed in Cheung, supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
101. Ripken, supra note 94, at 106. 
102. Id. 
103. WINKLER, supra note 4, at 49-52. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 48. 
106. Id. at 44-48 
107. Id. at 48 
108. Id. (stating that English law would only allow the creation of corporations if the king was 
sufficiently satisfied that the corporation’s charter was directed to the public interest).   
109. This perspective on incorporation could also be accurately described as a contractual 
theory of the firm. However, unlike the contractual theory of the firm described in Cheung, supra note 
41, this contractual theory concerns a contract between private parties hoping to create a corporation and 
the legislature who has the power to create one. The contractual theory of the firm asserts that 
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Corporations should be subject to legal obligations in order to deter 
corporate misconduct and provide an avenue of relief for individuals 
harmed by corporations. The American system of civil law relies on private 
suits as a deterrent to ensure that commercial actors conduct themselves 
scrupulously. We want natural people to have the capacity to settle 
commercial disputes with corporations and to have legal recourse for any 
wrongdoing. Legal obligations define the behavior that we expect from 
corporations and shape the expectations of natural persons who deal with 
them. In order to enforce their rights and obligations, corporations must be 
provided with a legal right to use the courts. Without the legal fiction of 
personhood, there is no clear way to sue a corporate entity and, therefore, 
no way to deter wrongdoing by these organizations.  
The Supreme Court endorsed the artificial view of corporate rights in 
one of the earliest corporate rights cases, Trustees of Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward.110 In Woodward, the New Hampshire legislature passed three 
pieces of legislation that would effectively turn Dartmouth College, a 
private corporation, into a public university. The legislation purported to 
amend Dartmouth’s charter by increasing the number of trustees from 
twelve to twenty-one, creating a twenty-five person oversight board where 
twenty-one seats would be controlled by the state of New Hampshire, and 
vesting the power to appoint new trustees in New Hampshire’s governor 
and council.111 These actions, when taken in concert, would have effectively 
given the state government control over Dartmouth College—a private 
corporation.  
In Woodward, the Supreme Court faced three legal issues. First, the 
Court had to determine whether a corporate charter constituted a contract.112 
After determining that a charter produced by the process of specific 
incorporation was a contract, the Court then addressed whether a corporate 
charter constituted a private contract, protected from government 
interference, as opposed to a public contract that the legislature could 
rightfully alter.113 The Court held that Dartmouth’s charter was a private 
 
 
corporations are a collection of private contracts binding individuals to one another in pursuit of a 
productive purpose.  
110. See GREENFIELD, supra note 88, at 19 (citing Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 
U.S. 518 (1819)).  
111. Woodward, 17 U.S. at 626. 
112. At the time of this case corporations were still created by the process of specific 
incorporation discussed on p. 18. Dartmouth College’s charter was actually granted by King George of 
England in 1769. GREENFIELD, supra note 88, at 19. 
113. Woodward, 17 U.S. at 627.  
It can require no argument to prove, that the circumstances of this case constitute a contract. 
An application is made to the crown for a charter to incorporate a religious and literary 
institution. . . . The charter is granted, and on its faith the property is conveyed. Surely, in this 
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contract.114 Finally, to determine whether Dartmouth college should receive 
the protection of the Contracts Clause, the Court had to address the ability 
of a corporate entity to invoke a constitutional right.115 The contracts clause 
does not reference persons, reference citizens, or in any way indicate that 
the contracts clause can only be invoked by natural persons.116 The Court 
did not have to squarely address the question of legal personhood or 
citizenship in this case; however the Court made it clear that corporations 
do indeed hold legal rights—including the right to invoke constitutional 
protections.117   
In his majority opinion, Chief Justice John Marshall famously wrote 
that “[a] corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing 
only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses 
only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either 
expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.”118 Marshall determined that 
the legal immunity from state action amending private contracts—provided 
by the Contracts Clause—was incidental to the existence of the corporation 
and that corporations must be allowed to assert such rights.119 While the 
Court has since retreated from its staunch preference for the artificial theory 
of corporate personhood, the theory remains academically viable.120 
Artificial theory takes the most flexible approach to the provision of 
corporate rights, leaving the decision of which rights to provide to 
legislatures—except for core commercial rights incident to the productive 
functions of the corporation. 
Corporations can still be considered legal “people” even if they are a 
creation of the law. Under the artificial-dependent theory, legal personhood 
is a practical means to accommodate corporations within the existing legal 
system. The fictitious and functional nature of corporate legal personhood 
justifies the discretionary assignment of corporate rights and responsibilities 
 
 
transaction every ingredient of a complete and legitimate contract is to be found. The points for 
consideration are, 1. Is this contract protected by the constitution of the United States? 2. Is it 
impaired by the acts under which the defendant holds? 
See Woodward, 17 U.S. at 629-30. 
114. Id.  
115. Id. 
116. The contracts clause is squarely aimed at limiting the power of state legislatures rather than 
bestowing rights on any individuals. In Hohfeldian terms the contracts clause provides an immunity 
against state interference with private contracts. Hohfeld, supra note 13, at 57.  
117. Woodward, 17 U.S. at 654 (“[I]n these private eleemosynary institutions, the body 
corporate, as possessing the whole legal and equitable interest, and completely representing the donors, 
for the purpose of executing the trust, has rights which are protected by the constitution.”) (alterations 
added). 
118. Id. at 636.  
119. Id. at 588-9. 
120. See generally GREENFIELD, supra note 88. 
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without regard for typical normative concerns. Corporations should only be 
afforded rights that are necessary to promote a corporate function. The 
primary purpose of corporations is to engage in productive activity with the 
goal of maximizing the wealth of shareholders.121 The shareholder wealth 
maximization norm constrains corporate autonomy and limits the ability of 
corporate decision-makers to consider the same range of options as an 
individual facing a similar dilemma.122 The artificial-dependent theory 
suggests that corporations lack autonomy because they are controlled by 
private individuals. The externalized decision-making process in a 
corporation prevents corporations from fully considering the moral 
implications of their actions. As a result of the “artificial-dependent” theory 
so applied, corporations cannot be expected to police their own actions 
subject to the principles of morality. Legislators could disregard any moral 
consideration over what rights a corporation deserves and instead focus on 
determining which rights the corporation needs. This contention does not 
defeat the utility of the artificial-dependent theory. Instead, it limits 
corporate rights to the rights that can be exercised without extensive moral 
judgements. This would include certain practical rights, such as property 
ownership and standing to sue, which corporations need to function.  
The downside of the fictitious personhood theory is that corporations 
face a great deal of uncertainty as to what rights they actually possess. A 
legislature relying on the artificial-dependent theory could justify stripping 
a corporation of some right or imposing a substantial legal obligation ex post 
to accord with their own changing views of the appropriate social functions 
of corporations. If basic rights are not fixed by an underlying legal theory 
and are subject to change at the will of a legislative body, then corporations 
will bear a heavy burden to determine whether a proposed course of action 
would ex ante be protected by a legal right. This state of affairs would shake 
the certainty of assumptions and could chill the activities of corporations by 
imposing extra decision-making costs on firms.123  
B. Independent Personhood Theory  
 The independent personhood theory of the corporation began 
circulating in the late nineteenth century as a philosophical foil for the 
artificial-dependent theory of corporate personhood. The basic premise of 
 
 
121. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 500 (1919); Roe, supra note 70. 
122. Id.  
123. See generally John Thrasher, Ordering Anarchy, 5 RMM 30, 32-35 (2014) (Explaining 
that decision costs are generally understood as an opportunity cost borne by an organization’s use of 
human capital to analyze any applicable rules to predict the likelihood of success of a proposed action.). 
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the independent personhood theory is that associations of natural persons 
can exist as entities outside of their members.124 Independent personhood 
theorists assert that corporations are capable of making rational decisions 
and that we should treat them as moral agents because they exist, act, and 
have the capacity to evaluate their decisions before acting.125 The 
independent personhood theory considers personhood to be a threshold and 
posits that corporations are deserving of all of the legal rights given to 
natural persons simply because they have met the absolute bare minimum 
description of a natural person.126  
The independent personhood theory treats corporations as moral agents 
with the ability to use their given rights according to moral principles. 
Therefore, because all moral agents have the capacity to make rational and 
socially acceptable decisions, corporations should be bestowed with every 
existing right of natural persons. The assignment of rights in our society 
comes with certain moral obligations. So long as corporations are able to 
perform the essential functions of moral agency, they should be entrusted 
with rights and expected to conform to legal obligations. As for the question 
of which rights to assign to corporations, the independent personhood 
theory suggests that corporations must receive the same rights as individual 
natural persons. Under the independent personhood theory, withholding 
rights from a corporate person—who is capable of exercising them—based 
solely upon their form is an impermissible form of discrimination. The 
Supreme Court has not directly addressed the independent personhood 
theory but has nonetheless relied on the basic premises of the theory to 
extend constitutional rights to corporations.127 There is also substantial 
academic literature surrounding the independent personhood theory.128  
The independent personhood theory offers corporations a tremendous 
amount of legal protection. By suggesting that there are no meaningful 
differences between how we would expect natural persons and corporations 
to exercise legal rights, the independent personhood theory acts as a barrier 
 
 
124. Krannich, supra note 94, at 80 (“The real entity theory generally views the corporate entity 
as a natural creature, to be recognized apart from its owners, existing autonomously from the state.”) 
125. Id. at 83 (“To legal realists, ‘the management corporation reconstituted the classical profit 
maximizer in collective form.’ This theory effectively turned the corporate entity into the individual 
actor the law sought to recognize.”) (footnote omitted) (quoting William W. Bratton, Jr., The New 
Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1490 (1989)). 
126. Krannich, supra note 94, at 83. 
127. See generally Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1822, 
90 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1986) (extending the Fourth Amendment to a chemical corporation whose property 
had been surveilled by EPA aircraft); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 567, 97 
S. Ct. 1349, 1352, 51 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1977) (extending the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy 
protections to a group of corporations previously acquitted by a hung jury). 
128. See Krannich, supra note 94, at 83-84. 
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to imposing additional legal obligations on corporations. This theory would 
lower the ex-ante costs of legal analysis for courts by providing 
predictability for corporate decision-makers. Similarly, adopting greater 
legal protections for corporations may serve to increase their total 
commercial output. However, the negative implications of the independent 
personhood theory loom large. Allowing corporations to avail themselves 
of rights which were specifically devised to protect the interests of natural 
persons may hinder the ability of the government to effectively regulate 
corporations in a manner that would be beneficial to the rest of society.  
C. Aggregate Theory 
The aggregate theory of corporate rights offers a logically distinct 
justification for providing legal rights to corporations. The aggregate theory 
posits that corporations are essentially nothing more than collections of 
individuals who are contractually bound to each other to pursue business 
purposes.129 Aggregate theory proponents rightfully point out that every 
action attributed to a corporation must actually be performed by a natural 
person.130 Because certain rights are deemed to be basic and inalienable in 
our society, individuals acting on behalf of the corporation should retain 
their existing legal rights.131  
Aggregate rights theory provides a justification for corporate rights that 
does not include the “invention” of corporate specific rights and, at first 
glance, seems to assuage many progressive concerns over the 
personification of corporations. Aggregate corporate rights theorists 
recognize that individual rights are designed to protect natural persons and 
simply argue that the social liberties accorded to individuals should not 
evaporate when those individuals act in the name of a corporate 
organization. Aggregate theory claims to protect the rights of the individuals 
rather than any rights specially vested to the organization. This theory is 
appealing because it seems to address the concerns of realist critics of 
corporate rights by recognizing the truism that corporations are in no way 
actual persons. The downside of aggregate rights theory is that it severely 
limits the ability of governments to regulate corporations without limiting 
the rights of natural persons along the way.  
 
 
129. Ripken, supra note 94, at 109-110. 
130. Id. at 110. 
131. Krannich, supra note 94, at 76-77 (citing VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW 
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS OTHER THAN CHARITABLE § 1, at 2 (1882)). 
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The Supreme Court has been receptive to the aggregate theory of 
corporate rights, especially in recent years.132 In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores Inc., the Court considered whether the owners of private, for-profit 
corporations could claim that complying with a regulation substantially 
burdened their rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(“RFRA”) and the First Amendment.133 The RFRA prohibits the 
Government from placing a substantial burden on any person’s exercise of 
religion unless the method of regulation chosen is the least restrictive 
possible means to achieve a compelling government interest.134 The RFRA 
did not define the word “person” in the statute so the court was left to 
determine whether Hobby Lobby, and other for-profit corporations, should 
be considered persons.135 In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that corporations 
are indeed people and that closely held corporations could invoke the RFRA 
to avoid providing certain types of contraceptive care through their 
company health plan.136,137  
Justice Samuel Alito, writing for the majority, opined that “[w]hen 
rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the 
purpose is to protect the rights of [shareholders, officers, and 
employees].”138 The Hobby Lobby decision thus rests on an assertion that 
these privately held corporations must be considered to hold the religious 
beliefs of their shareholders. This underlying assumption is incompatible 
with the doctrine of corporate separateness and imputes the idiosyncratic 
views of shareholders to the corporate entity. The majority opinion brushes 
off HHS’s argument that the owners of for-profit corporations forfeit their 
rights to assert RFRA claims on behalf of the incorporated entity.139 The 
Court, in effect, asserts that the corporation must be considered to be an 
extension of the family that owns it.  
 
 
132. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 573 U.S. 682, 691-92 (2014). 
133. See generally id.  
134. Id. at 705. 
135. Id. at 706-08. 
136. Id. 
137. GREENFIELD, supra note 88, at 97. 
138. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 706-07. 
139. Id. at 705-06.  
HHS would put these merchants to a difficult choice: either give up the right to seek judicial 
protection of their religious liberty or forgo the benefits, available to their competitors, of 
operating as corporations.  
As we have seen, RFRA was designed to provide very broad protection for religious liberty. 
By enacting RFRA, Congress went far beyond what this Court has held is constitutionally 
required. Is there any reason to think that the Congress that enacted such sweeping protection 
put small-business owners to the choice that HHS suggests? 
Id. at 706 (footnote omitted). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss2/7
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Throughout the majority opinion, Justice Alito implicitly relies on the 
aggregate theory to refute the contention that for-profit corporations cannot 
exercise religion. His analysis focused on the burdens imposed on the ability 
of Hobby Lobby’s controlling shareholders to exercise their religion. 
However, the Court also accepted Hobby Lobby’s assertion that the 
company ought to be considered a person under the RFRA. If Hobby Lobby 
is a person possessing rights to freely exercise their religion, it seems like 
Hobby Lobby must, itself, have a religion to exercise. Instead, the Court 
slyly takes advantage of the metaphor of personhood, which entails some 
form of either the independent personhood theory or the artificial dependent 
theory, and then proceeds to disregard the theoretical implications of either 
theory to assure that the RFRA applies. 
IV. WHY SHOULD WE GIVE CORPORATIONS RIGHTS? 
 Legislators and scholars should seek to find and apply a corporate-
rights-justifying theory which meshes with the underlying rationales for 
providing individual rights to natural persons. We need corporations, and 
corporations need rights. Our common law system seeks to define and direct 
the behavior of natural persons, governments, and associations by assigning 
rights and imposing legal obligations. Without some notion of personhood, 
or another rights-justifying framework, corporations could not operate 
under the existing legal structure. The ideal rights-justifying theory of the 
corporate person should be consistent with the underlying rationales for 
providing individual rights to natural persons while providing corporations 
with a high degree of predictability about their legal rights and obligations.  
The artificial-dependent theory of corporate personhood is the best 
available theory of corporate personhood because it provides legislators 
with the flexibility they need to assess which rights corporations need and 
which rights we cannot expect them to exercise responsibly. Individuals 
only keep rights which they are able to exercise, and the granting of 
corporate rights should be no different. Corporations should only be 
afforded rights which they possess the requisite consciousness to use 
appropriately to pursue their organizational objectives. This approach to the 
provision of corporate rights all but eliminates the viability of an aggregate 
rights theory.  
By vesting a corporation with the rights of the individuals who own the 
corporation, the aggregate theory ignores the question of whether or not a 
corporation has the capability to use this right and whether or not a 
corporation should be able to invoke a specific right. Furthermore, the 
aggregate theory is inconsistent with the basic premise of corporate law that 
a corporation is distinct from its owners. The owners of corporations are 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
292 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 12:2 
 
 
 
able to reap the financial benefits of the corporation’s activities while 
escaping personal responsibility for the corporation’s actions. Shareholders 
should not be able to assert their own rights through a corporate entity while 
dodging the accompanying legal obligations of the corporation. Corporate 
separation is a core piece in the background of corporate law and, although 
it is a legal fiction, should be applied consistently to all facets of the 
corporation’s legal existence—including the existence and breadth of 
corporate rights. Aggregate right theory does not mesh with the underlying 
corporate law and, as such, is an inadequate rights theory.  
The law should strive to provide corporations with the rights they need 
to fulfill their productive mandate while preserving the primacy of natural 
persons in rights theory. Individual rights are assigned with the 
understanding that the recipients will exercise their mental faculties and 
exercise their moral judgement when acting.140 Corporations cannot 
rationally be said to exercise the same type of consciousness as individuals. 
Individuals and corporations exercise fundamentally different decision-
making processes. Corporate decision making is clearly distinct from 
individual decision making in terms of both the processes employed and the 
range of objectives pursued.141 Individuals consider their options internally, 
although we will occasionally ask one another for help. However, in the 
realm of individual decision making, the ultimate choice of conduct is 
ultimately controlled entirely by a single entity. Every internal consideration 
which informs the ultimate decision is presented on equal footing and given 
equal weight—allowing moral concerns an equal platform for 
consideration. However, in the corporate context, almost every significant 
decision requires input from individuals within the firm.142 Moral 
perspectives can be ignored entirely, or given relatively little weight, if they 
originate from a natural person who is low on the institutional totem pole or 
disfavored by the ultimate decision maker. Additionally, the profit 
maximization motivation of business corporations can blind corporate 
managers to the negative implications of their decisions for others.143  
Corporations are built differently than natural persons, and these 
differences shape the ways we expect corporations to exercise their rights. 
As such, our legal system should carefully evaluate the nature of 
 
 
140. See the discussion supra Section I.C.  
141. According to moral theorist John Ladd, corporations, and other formal organizations, make 
decisions that are directed towards and evaluated against some pre-determined objective rather than 
being evaluated for their moral value. Ladd, supra note 1, at 495-96. 
142. See generally, Bernard K. Hooper, Choose One: Expediter or Cat Herder? The Role of 
The In-House Counsel in Corporate Decision Making, 12 BUS. L. TODAY 11 (2003); Ladd, supra note 
1, at 493. 
143. Roe, supra note 70, at 2066. 
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corporations and provide these organizations with the rights they need to 
carry out their functions, while reserving the remaining rights for natural 
persons. Instead of hoping to build up corporate morals, the law ought to 
recognize that corporations are fundamentally limited in their ability to 
exercise morality when making decisions. Consequently, the rights of 
corporations should be curtailed to include only those rights that we are 
comfortable with corporations exercising in an amoral fashion.  
Given the fundamental differences between the existence of 
corporations and natural persons, it makes more sense to apply the artificial-
dependent existence theory. The artificial-dependent theory would allow 
legislatures to assess what rights are necessary for corporations to operate 
in our society. If legislatures were to proceed in accordance with the 
aggregate theory, corporations would be able to exercise rights that are 
commensurate with their incentives and abilities to make organized 
decisions while preserving rights that were intended only for natural 
persons. The artificial dependent theory allows legislators to assess the 
conscious capabilities of corporations and legislate appropriately.  
V. CONCLUSION  
The law ought to ensure that corporations are afforded only the rights 
that are relevant to their purposes to preserve the delicate balance of rights 
and legal obligations among private citizens, the government, and 
corporations. Social contract theory posits that the rights assigned to natural 
persons and the corresponding legal obligations owed by natural persons to 
each other and the government represent an intentional balance between 
public and private power. Corporations have upset this delicate balance by 
taking advantage of “personhood” to pursue their financial interests at the 
expense of the broader community.  
Corporations are fundamentally different from natural persons, and the 
law should recognize these differences when determining the proper extent 
of corporate rights. The law presumes the existence and operation of 
conscious decision-making in individuals. Most importantly, the law 
assumes that individuals will consider the moral implications of their 
actions. Unlike individuals, corporations are obligated to pursue the 
interests of their shareholders rather than the interests of morality. 
Corporations are unable to exercise the same decision-making processes as 
individuals due to their externally motivated decision-making structure and 
the resulting lack of autonomy. Because corporations do not act as moral 
agents, the law should not entrust them with the same rights as individuals.  
Legislators ought to critically examine the nature and purpose of 
business corporations to determine why corporations need rights and to 
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asses which rights to provide to corporations. The artificial dependent 
theory provides the best theoretical justification for the provision of 
corporate rights because it offers legislators the flexibility to make practical 
decisions about the provision of corporate rights that account for the lack of 
moral agency among business corporations. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss2/7
